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Introduction
International lawyers and institutions today, charged with a cosmopolitan
ethos, demonstrate the desire to project a technicality that they hope will
bring legitimacy to their projects. Pushing states to the background as
mere intermediate stages in the rise of a global federation under the rule of
law, they portray international law as the saviour of individual human
rights against the marked politics of state sovereignty1. The “technisiza-
tion” of different regimes in international law has enabled the fragmented
fields to push against each other’s specialization as a means to prioritize
their own agendas, leaving open the perennial question: who has jurisdic-
tion? In other words, who can decide? While a clash of jurisdictions playing
out the political choice making at the international institutional level has
received much attention already, von Bogdandy and Venzke turn the
question on its head in their book and ask “In Whose Name” do these
institutions decide?
Shifting the focus from the jurisdictional question to the space of repre-
sentational politics2 raises umpteen questions and concerns. In the current
international legal sphere of innumerable courts and tribunals, with each
I.
* Researcher, Erik Castren Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Univer-
sity of Helsinki.
1 This theme has been discussed in detail by Koskenniemi, M. (2005), From Apology
to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, Reissue with a New Epilogue.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, and later mapped in: Koskenniemi, M.
(2002), The Gentle Civiliser of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–
1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also: Lauterpacht, H. (1933),
The Function of Law in the International Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2 While using the term “representational politics”, I do not equate representation
with democracy, albeit I use the phrase alluding to the space of democratic politics
the authors von Bogdandy and Venzke refer to, in which representation can occur.
See: Ernesto L. (1996), Emancipation(s). London: Verso. See also: Laclau, E. &
Mouffe, Ch. (2001), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, where they
describe a representation of interests as one where there is a transparent relation-
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institution having their own internal hierarchies and schemas, to speak in
the name of the people begs the question who those people are, to avoid
projecting a homogeneity on the “represented”, and which people get
excluded when we make such determinations. Would refugees or sans
papier migrants fit within the category of people in whose name interna-
tional courts speak? Furthermore, this would require an understanding of
whose agenda the court is advancing and whether that agenda continues to
have a Westphalian bias, primarily. Nonetheless, even within the West-
phalian contours, the heterogeneity of the “people” begs the question
whether institutions like the International Criminal Court are speaking in
the name of the Africans they target, or the Western world they mostly
refrain from targeting. Whether the European Court of Human Rights
speaks in the name of all Europeans or merely in the name of a Western
European ethos they believe will help civilize the Eastern Europeans. At
the same time, would transposing a representative element onto these insti-
tutions run counter to their depoliticized frameworks? Lastly, the “in
whose name” question downplays the importance of the decision maker,
because it suggests that no matter which court ends up having jurisdiction,
what eventually matters is that they speak in the name of the people.
Resolving these tensions necessitates zooming both in and out. Von
Bogdandy and Venzke idealize the “unique possibility of giving a voice to
individuals who are affected by the actions of a foreign state”, or one’s own
State. Yet, they remain pragmatic in recognizing the limits of such a possi-
bility, deeming it “indispensable to the legitimation of every court that it
operates at a distance from political processes”3. Portraying international
courts as “beacons of humanity” that place limits on states’ exercise of
power based on a “universal community of values”, they cater to what has
become a standard trope among international law scholars: of the
international’s rescue from state authoritarianism. Treating the interna-
tional as a means to ameliorate cases of democratic exclusion domestically,
such a stance affords international courts the opportunity to set right fla-
grant violations occurring domestically, whilst ignoring completely
whether these courts themselves can perpetuate the exclusion they some-
times prevent. Courts as “actors of international public authority” can be a
useful premise, given the competition between functional regimes.4 How-
ship between the representative and the represented, wherein the former promotes
the interest of the latter.
3 Von Bogdandy, A. and Venzke, I. (2014), In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of
International Adjudication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19.
4 Ibid., 100.
Parvathi Menon
72 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908661-71, am 24.07.2020, 14:03:38
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ever, that would also require an international political society that is capa-
ble of determining the jurisdiction and extent of such public authority.
Not unlike the inter-war liberal internationalism, the public theory of
adjudication rests upon the managerial underpinnings of a global federa-
tion idea that was rife during that period. Yet, in the absence of such a fed-
eration of global legislative mechanism, it is perhaps a worthy reminder
that we are in fact in a world of competing hegemonic ideas, and not the
global constitutionalism that such an international public authority is
deemed to create.5
On the other hand, while zooming in, it seems perturbingly obvious
that many of the suppositions of international equality and humanitarian-
ism, which have become the signposts of a liberal idea of legality, rest on
the technicalities of procedural guarantees. These guarantees, on a closer
inspection, reveal the structural biases that aid greatly in the determina-
tions of fairness or other standards that lend the system its legitimacy. By
focusing on whom these guarantees safeguard, problematic as they already
are, the theory ignores who chose them as the hallmark of universal stan-
dards, and what those choices entail in allowing an enduring legacy of a
constitutionalism resembling empires of the 18th and 19th centuries. Ques-
tioning whether procedural systematization accounts for the diversity
within the international community or its distribution of resources will
foster an understanding of the field as one that is full of contestable and
contested choices.
In this paper, I focus on two different sides of the relationship between
international adjudicatory mechanisms and the democratic inclusiveness
they project onto the international: an external and an internal perspec-
tives. In the external perspective, I shall pan out to examine whether the
democratic ideal of the international adjudicatory bodies engages with the
history of the field, its undemocratic origins, and the contestations that
currently reproduce its asymmetrical beginnings. The external allows me
to demonstrate how the power structures at play embolden a type of exclu-
sionism and particularity in the name of inclusion and universalism in
international courts and tribunals. Thereafter, the internal view will close
in on some of the specific guarantees or standards that define democratic
legitimacy of courts. Standards such as impartiality and independence of
5 See: De Wet, E. (2006), “The Emergence of International and Regional Value Sys-
tems as a Manifestation of the Emerging Constitutional Order”, Leiden Journal of
International Law 19(3), 611–632. Cf. Koskenniemi, M. (2007), “International Law:
Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education”, European
Journal of Legal Studies (1), 1–18.
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judges or, more generally, a procedural fairness, I argue, discount the actu-
ality of the issues plaguing the international system. Whether procedural
fairness can ensure substantive fairness in these international courts and
tribunals that were built on uneven playing fields will form the second
part of my analysis. In gauging the (internal) relationship between interna-
tional courts and people, this paper shall examine the substantive and pro-
cedural mechanisms stated to enable such representation; whether
concepts such as fairness, in relation to judges (i.e., impartiality) along
with its procedural guarantees, expose international law’s conflicting real-
ity will form the basis of the examination. In other words, this paper will
study the implications of the democratic ideology that has long pervaded
international law by relying on examples of its perpetuation of the North-
South “dynamic of difference”6.
Europe vis-à-vis the Rest: Democracy and Its Discontents in International
Adjudication
When the effort towards democratization was made in relation to states, it
brought about a wave of ambition, implicitly forcing states to re-model
and restructure in order to meet the prescribed standard to be worthy of
membership into the international community.7 Democracy was becom-
ing the basis for governmental legitimacy in international law, evidenced
by the work of Thomas Franck.8 Political theorists like Hanna Pitkin
treaded more cautiously because of the various meanings she ascribed to
democratic representation—delegation, trusteeship, descriptive and sym-
bolic representation—arguing that representation does not mean democ-
racy (and most often runs counter to any real democracy).9 Scholars like
von Bogdandy and Venzke, but also others like Richard Bellamy who
engage with the question “who represents whom and how” allow represen-
tation to pivot on the existence of formal democratic processes of autho-
rization and accountability to ensure democratic values are being pro-
II.
6 Anghie, A. (2005), Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7 Franck, T. (1992), “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, American Jour-
nal of International Law 86(1), 46–91.
8 Marks, S. (2011), “What has become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Gover-
nance?”, European Journal of International Law 22(2), 507–524.
9 Pitkin, H. (1967), The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Parvathi Menon
74 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908661-71, am 24.07.2020, 14:03:38
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
moted.10 Although von Bogdandy and Venzke explicitly refrain from
attributing any real representational quality to judicial institutions, they
allude to the election of judges as an example of what representation can
entail in such bodies.11
The marriage between democracy and legitimacy became the clarion
call for the international community to recalibrate its expectations towards
states seeking membership into its hallowed institutional circles. If we
look at the debate that arose after Thomas Franck published his influential
piece on democracy, there was a clear shift from the community to the
individual: the kind of serious individualism that mirrored the universality
it celebrated.12 Equally, there was also an emerging cosmopolitanism that
celebrated the “context-dependent variety of legitimate actions, of lawyers
and courts, not through judicial technique, but rather through the intu-
itive application of good sense”13. This good sense, it was imagined, united
people like the logic of the market. Democracy implied such good sense,
or vice versa.
While democracy has been prescribed as the preferred process to bridge
the legitimacy gap in international courts and institutions, scholars opine,
“an institution is legitimate if its power is justified in terms of moral and
other socially embedded beliefs, and if those subject to its rule recognize
that it should be obeyed”14. If we presume the democratic process to be
one of such belief, there is no doubt that its fulfilment would grant inter-
national courts its requisite legitimation. Yet, this presumption overlooks
two aspects: firstly, is democracy as desirable as its endorsement reflects?
Secondly, if yes, is international law itself a product of such a democratic
process that can grant legitimacy according to the thesis put forward by the
authors?
10 Bellamy, R. and Castiglione, D. (2011), “Democracy by Delegation? Who Repre-
sents Whom and How in European Governance”, Government and Opposition
46(1), 101–125.
11 Von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 3, 148.
12 Koskenniemi, M. (2002–2003), “Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic
World”, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 35, 471–486, 481. Von Bog-
dandy and Venzke refer to the Treaty of the European Union as embodying such
individualistic approaches, tracing it back to a Kantian or Hobbesian idea. Von
Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 3, 140.
13 Ibid.
14 Zaum, D. (2013), “International Organizations, Legitimacy and Legitimation” In:
D. Zaum (ed.), Legitimating International Organizations. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 3–25, 9.
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From the liberal democratic theory to deliberative democracy and other
discursive approaches, the history of the democratic tradition has seen a
variety of descriptions. Even if the history has not been without turbu-
lence,15 scholars—both Western and otherwise—have praised the universal
appeal and value of democracy.16 Its practice, however, has degenerated
from a concept of direct citizen participation to one that has become only
indirectly plausible. Citizen participation in the decision-making process,
as one of the ideals of democracy, has been hardly met by modern states.17
In fact, the concept of democratic decision-making has been reduced to
the individuals’ right to vote, evincing the disappearance of “the more radi-
cal association of democracy with popular power” in Western thought.18
Despite the dissonance, the dissonance, international law has implicated
notions of democracy.
The evolution of democracy within the context of international law has
met with strong opposition with regard to its credentials, historically, as
being a “product of the interests and practices of imperial powers”19. Inter-
national law and its initiative to bring about “good governance” began
(re)colonizing through the language of globalization. “The concept of
good governance, in turn, generated more specific programs focusing on
how international law and institutions could promote democratic gover-
nance and legitimate governance.”20 Antony Anghie focuses on institutions
that have higher impact on the peoples of the Third World, like the IMF
and the World Bank, in order to demonstrate how “despite the opportuni-
ties and advantages it is supposed to create, [it] has intensified inequalities
between the West and the Third World” through the use of the concept of
governance. Much like the mantra of global governance, myriad legal prin-
15 Charlesworth, H. (2014), “Democracy and International Law”, Collected Courses of
the Hague Academy of International Law 371, 54–69. For example, the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 was thought to be the turning point, a “possible end point in
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama, F. (1992), The
End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 4).
16 See: Sen, A. (1999), “Democracy as a Universal value”, Journal of Democracy 10(3),
3–17. See also: Ibrahim, A. (2006), “Universal Values and Muslim Democracy”,
Journal of Democracy 17(3), 5–12.
17 Dahl, R. (1956), A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
See also: Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
18 Charlesworth, supra note 15, 60.
19 Ibid., 70–95.
20 Anghie, supra note 6, 246.
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ciples in international law bear the burden of European thought and his-
tory. Tracing the genealogies of any of them would lead us to seeing the
shaping of the world from a very Eurocentric point of view.
The public theory of adjudication comes with its own guilt of presum-
ing how the European solution could be fitted and adjusted to other juris-
dictions. Whether it may be possible or not does not form the basis of my
argument, but the presumption that it is an ideal worth pursuing based
entirely on the European experience calls for criticism, similar to those
levied by scholars against the European origins of international law.21 The
liberal theory of democracy, despite its undemocratic creation, has brought
about a formulaic approach to the requirements that must be met in order
to increase the prospects for peace under international law.22 Anne-Marie
Slaughter argues that international law makes no difference between lib-
eral and non-liberal states under the law; yet, there is an inherent percep-
tion that the liberal state is the Gold Standard. If we adopt the same stance
in the case of the democratic theory of adjudication, we find that the crite-
ria listed out as the measures to meet in order to fulfil the liberal ambition
carries forward the implicit desire to impose the European expectation
onto non-Western experiences.
When it came to international organizations, the model of democracy
was considered as aspirational as it was in the case of states. Albeit, as expli-
cated by Robert Dahl in his chapter on democratic functioning of interna-
tional organizations, popular control in democratic countries was admit-
tedly difficult, making the case of international organizations (or courts, in
this case) an aggravated problem.23 Relying on the difficulties that arise
from the epistemic limits, cultural diversity and procedural factors, Dahl
portrays the farfetchedness of any type of control that a people can exert
on decision-making in international organizations. With respect to the
procedural factors, specifically, he maintains that the substantive and pro-
21 See: Ibid.; Koskenniemi, M. (2001), Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of
International Law, 1870–1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22 Marks, S. (2000), The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy,
and the Critique of Ideology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 43; Cf. Slaughter,
A.-M. (1992), “Towards an Age of Liberal Nations”, Harvard International Law Jour-
nal 33(2), 393–495, 403.
23 Dahl, R. (1999), “Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s
View” In: I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordoj (eds), Democracy’s Edges. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
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cedural hurdles to realize “public good”, as in the case of governments,
become more pronounced when exported into the international sphere.24
Von Bogdandy and Venzke use the Treaty of the European Union (TEU)
as a point of reference to elucidate the concept of democracy for institu-
tions beyond the state.25 They consider citizenship (Article 9), representa-
tion (Article 10), deliberation, participation, transparency, responsiveness
and control (Article 11) and a reorientation of domestic parliamentarian-
ism (Article 12) as the pillars of democratic engagement. Transposing these
values from the TEU onto the international judicial framework presumes
the efficiency of the values in delivering the “democratic” end product
within the context of the European Union, even if clearly stated that it
does not offer an exemplar of ideal democratic governance. The TEU, con-
sidered the result of democratic politics via the Lisbon Treaty, it is said, car-
ries the legitimacy that comes with such a long process of deliberative and
elaborate procedures. However, requiring democratization to legitimize
governance or (public) authority in its move from the local to the universal
has standardized the democratic expectation, and therefore reduced its
engagement with ground realities. Reducing the differences, whilst nor-
malizing the (democratic) expectation, creates an illusion of homogeneity,
even in the European context, let alone beyond the European borders.
Thus creating a concept of “international democracy” leaves much to be
desired.26
Von Bogdandy and Venzke, while claiming that “political representation
is indispensable”, are also clear that “it does not exhaust the democratic
idea”. Relying on the Treaty of the European Union, they believe that “Arti-
cle II of the TEU contains further guidelines for more inclusiveness. Trans-
parency, the involvement of affected individuals, and dialogue—the cor-
nerstones of Article II—are of particular importance for an international
judiciary, because they identify strategies by which courts can contribute to
their democratic legitimation”27.
Equating participating in the “political process” to emancipation or
political inclusion is one of the well-known critiques against democracy. I
can see how a politically emancipated population/citizens, through very
localized institutional mechanisms for example, can probably feel a part of
24 Benhabib, S. (2014), “Democratic Sovereignty and Transnational Law: On Legal
Utopianism and Democratic Skepticism”, APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper, 1–52,
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2455436, accessed 7 February 2020.




78 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748908661-71, am 24.07.2020, 14:03:38
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
a vertically upward legitimation process, but it is unclear how positive law
from above can emancipate the disenfranchised groups at the bottom,
using techniques that involve reinforcements of rights they barely possess.
This begs the question: how does one relate binding every public authority
by these human rights to the “bureaucratic vocabulary human rights have
become, available for defending whatever interests or preferences the
speaker wants to defend”28. A right is one thing, but the expediency of the
right could be quite another.
Democratic Inclusion and Exclusion
The conundrum surrounding the failure of the democratic objective in
adjudicatory bodies leaves us with the oft-asked question: what are the
other alternatives? In the engagement between courts and the people
approaching its corridors, as I argued above, the depoliticization of law has
been the primary reason for the court’s inability to go beyond the
sophistry of the law. What once used to be achievable through political
recourse today is inhibited by a technicization of the means to achieve it.
Yet, the persisting problem with the liberal idea of legality is exactly that:
the projection of a neutral formula that does not submit itself to the
vagaries of politicking. The public theory of international adjudication
falls prey to such excessive legalization, within the realm of international
law, when it espouses that positive law can form the basis of a democratic
concept of the judiciary’s workings. In this section, I will rely on the
jurisprudence of two courts: one, which von Bogdandy and Venzke credit
with a high degree of “democratic legitimation”: the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), and two, which the scholars admit lacks sufficient
democratic quotient: the International Criminal Court (ICC). I argue that
while both these courts work differently and pursue different agendas, they
both project an inclusive and exclusive ideal, contesting the characteriza-
tion of their varied levels of democratic legitimacy. Such an approach helps
establish two aspects: one, that the democratic quotient of the human
rights language as protecting communities from domestic exclusion is
flawed, much like that of the ICC, which has received its fair share of criti-
A.
28 Koskenniemi, M. (2006), “Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institu-
tional Power”, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarian-
ism, and Development 1(1), 47–58, available at https://muse.jhu.edu/article/394857/
pdf, accessed 7 February 2020.
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cism for its selection of cases. Two, even if the democratic legitimacy rests
upon a procedural approach of representativeness, the substantive asymme-
tries project the ethnocentrism procedural guarantees try to avoid.
The ECtHR employs what von Bogdandy and Venzke call the “commu-
nity-based approach”, reflecting the “European consensus”. The “thick layer
of legal normativity over domestic constitutions” that the ECtHR lays
down is understood as stabilizing the normative expectations.29 Created to
address complaints by individuals against their State, the ECtHR demon-
strates an equality that brings out through its inclusiveness a type of ratio-
nal cosmopolitanism that goes beyond kind of “self-other” distinction
endemic to international law more generally.30 Such cosmopolitanism may
even become convincing to the detractors of universalism to be a reality
they must accept. Yet, what we see in the jurisprudence coming from the
court is a range of diverse notions of how discrimination looks, for exam-
ple.
In a set of cases, where the court dealt with the meaning and import of
Article 14, it has prevented discriminatory acts based on the individuals’
identities as Roma, Jewish, Turkish origins etc. The court has also main-
tained that the right to practice one’s own religion and manifest it is uncon-
ditional and absolute under Article 9.31 Equally, the same court issued a
series of decisions allowing Turkey, France, and Belgium to ban head-
scarves or veils, as not being in violation of Article 9. Starting with Leyla
Şahin v. Turkey (2004), the court persistently upheld that the banning of
scarves did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights (Con-
vention). Following the Turkish case, the ECtHR went on to uphold its
decision in S. A. S v. France (2014) and in the twin cases of Dakir v. Bel-
gium and Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (2017). Describing the veil ban
cases as those where the court took into account the domestic contexts, it
was held that “the choice of the extent and form such regulations should
take must inevitably be left, up to a point, to the State concerned”. The cos-
mopolitanism of the court and its European consensus thus reverted to the
29 Von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 3, 70.
30 The Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) highlights the distinc-
tion to enumerate how international law continues to uphold the civilizational
discourse between the Global North and the South, using it as a mechanism to
exercise control whilst projecting a type of faux sovereign equality. See: Anghie,
supra note 6. See also: Said, E. (2014) [1979], Orientalism. London: Penguin.
31 Ivanova v. Bulgaria, ECtHR Application No. 52435/99, Judgement of 12 April
2007, para 79; Mockute v. Lithuania, ECtHR Application no. 66490/09, Judgement
of 27 February 2018, para 119.
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State, after all, in the name of maintaining public order. The ECtHR sacri-
ficed its community-oriented approach at the altar of security concerns of
a state-oriented world. Such conflicting rights are at the very core of
human rights adjudication, thus making any cosmopolitan aspiration
merely a cover under which the status quo remains. If the community-ori-
ented approach constantly clashes with its state-oriented surroundings,
confronting its own limits, the possibilities of the ‘international’ pushing
the States to provide for a domestic inclusive community fails before it
even begins. At the same time, requiring international adjudicative bodies
to foster inclusion in domestic societies equally presupposes a clarity sur-
rounding what individual identity means and its treatment in the most
unidimensional manner. Thus, in the words of Koskenniemi, the liberal
idea of legality continues in the pragmatic space of the in-between: a little
more than positive law and a little less than morality.32
The pragmatism accompanying what we today herald as democratically
legitimate spaces of international adjudication becomes more precarious in
fields such as international criminal law. Openly admitting to its struggle
between individual criminal responsibility and its need for State coopera-
tion to prosecute international crimes, the international criminal court in
all its cosmopolitan fervour deems its agenda as rising above all differ-
ences, given the ius cogens nature of the crimes it wishes to prosecute. Fight-
ing impunity implies that all victims and the “interests of justice” remain
paramount to the court, until it faces its own boundaries when it wants to
investigate the crimes committed by the US armed forces in Afghanistan.
Determining that such an investigation would not be in the “interests of
justice”, the Pre-Trial Chamber enunciates “interests of justice” from an
extremely pragmatic point of view. In the words of the presiding judge,
Justice Mindua, “an investigation can hardly be said to be in the interests
of justice if the relevant circumstances are such as to make such investiga-
tion not feasible and inevitably doomed to failure”33. Any kind of radical-
ism that may have been attributed to the court finally investigating the
hegemon turned into a case of the Emperor merely wearing new clothes,
even if it was not the only basis of the court’s decision. Nonetheless, the
clash between a variety of cosmopolitanism ushered in by the international
criminal court and its pragmatic view of justice as something to be pur-
32 Koskenniemi, M. (1997), “Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International
Law”, European Journal of International Law 8(2), 215–263.
33 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investi-
gation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC Pre-Trial Cham-
ber II, 12 April 2019, para 90.
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sued only if “feasible” is a glaring reminder of the limits of international
adjudication and a welcome step towards its acceptance. At the same time,
the court in a prior case of Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Gombo Bemba34 chose
the technicalities of the law (“rule of law”)35 in favour of what some
scholars called the “interests of the victims”36. A case of competing univer-
salisms, scholars on both sides of the debate argued whether procedural
justice or substantive justice satiated their appetite for inclusiveness.
Choosing the former means that the excessive technisization shrouds the
real purpose of the court: to fight impunity. The latter implies a disservice
to the processes the court must uphold: fair trials and equality of arms.37
Beyond the struggle of the ICC between these competing interests, the
question that has loomed large over the court has been whether in the
quest for procedural fairness while fighting impunity, the court’s “radar for
racism is permanently broken”38.
What I describe as substantive justice, which demands that victims feel
vindicated, does not take away from the larger asymmetries that plague the
court, or courts more generally. Whether it is the exclusion of the Muslim
“other” or the African “other”, the courts do not shy away from imposing
in the name of procedural guarantees and rule of law what is an inherent
Eurocentrism upon the rest of the world. Who that includes and who that
excludes may not be immediately discernible in courts other than the ICC,
but a closer look into their workings reveal that no court, not even the one
with the highest democratic quotient, is free from its European bias.
34 Case No ICC-01/05–01/08–3636-Red (Official Case No) ICL 1849 (ICC 2018).
35 Heinze, A. (2018), “Some Reflections on the Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgment”,
Opinio Juris, 18 June, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2018/06/18/some-reflectio
ns-on-the-bemba-appeals-chamber-judgment/, accessed 7 February 2020.
36 See: Sadat, L. (2018), “Fiddling While Rome Burns? The Appeals Chamber’s Curi-
ous Decision in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”, EJIL: Talk!, 12 June,
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/fiddling-while-rome-burns-the-appeals-chamb
ers-curious-decision-in-prosecutor-v-jean-pierre-bemba-gombo/, accessed 7
February 2020; Amman, D.M. (2018), “In Bemba and Beyond, Crimes Adjudged
to Commit Themselves”, EJIL: Talk!, 13 June, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/i
n-bemba-and-beyond-crimes-adjudged-to-commit-themselves/, accessed 7 Febru-
ary 2020.
37 See: Koskenniemi, M. (2002), “Between Impunity and Show Trials”, Max Planck
Yearbook of United Nations Law 6(1), 1–35.
38 I thank Sundhya Pahuja for this phrasing.
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Who is the Fairest of Them All? The Legitimating Force of Impartiality and
Independence
The book written by von Bogdandy and Venzke presents a very bold thesis
of, inter alia, re-imagining the premise of international adjudication
through the lens of a democratic process through their public law theory
of adjudication. Looking at international courts as more than mere dispute
settlers, the book suggests a renewed understanding of judiciaries at the
international level. They argue a popular sovereignty thesis: that courts
draw their legitimacy not just from the consent of the states, the interna-
tional community, the parties to the dispute or the regimes they are a part
of, but from the people and the citizens they were (indirectly) constituted
by. When investigating into the conceptual frameworks within which such
a democratic theory functions, it is prudent to begin at the level of its aspi-
rations. Etymologically concerned with the role of people in governance,
democracy aspires to consult these people and enable their participation in
the process of making choices.39 What this consultation entails and how
limited these choices may be, are aspects that throw light on the relation-
ship between international courts and the “people”. Thereby linking politi-
cal transformations with socio-economic justice, it is my argument that
examining democratic principles against the (in)ability of judicial authori-
ties to ensure such justice exposes the pitfalls of the democratic veil that
attempts to equalize even in the face of inherent inequalities. In a Hegelian
sense, international institutions created through democratic processes do
not bridge the gap between private and communal interest; on the other
hand, they decrease the scope for mutual recognition.40
The legalisation of the international order and its subsequent bureaucra-
tization become aspects such legitimacy claims miss, and ardently support.
The judicial processes and procedures, if anything, relegate political partic-
ipation to the margins. In doing so, a thesis that lays as its foundation the
democratic legitimacy of international adjudication must ironically
bemoan the call to politicize. The contradiction that emanates from such a
characterization, I argue, is precisely why the idealism related to adjudica-
tion’s democratic quotient deserves questioning. Two aspects bear import
here. First, why does depoliticization remain at the core of judicialization?
B.
39 Franck, T. (1995), Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 83.
40 Ferro, B. (2019), “Hegel, Liberalism, and the Pitfalls of Representative Democ-
racy”, Hegel Bulletin 40(2), 215–236.
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Depoliticization renders the democratic concept wanting, and forces us to
revisit the implications of foisting its idealism upon international courts
and tribunals. Second, the legalization of the international order in turn
maintains the “dynamic of difference” between the Global North and the
South, rendering in its democratic quotient what Susan Marks calls the
dominant ideology, subsumed in the judicial processes.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that nation-states create inter-
national adjudicatory bodies, whether as part of or separate from an inter-
national organizational structure. These international or supranational
bodies are further removed from political mobilization than nation-states.
At the same time, we should exercise caution with regard to such an
approach. Supranational or international institutions are, equally, an exten-
sion of the nation-states that constitute them. Relying largely on procedu-
ral mechanisms to entrench the so-called democratic quotient into the
adjudicatory model perhaps alludes to the illusion that irrespective of the
differences between states and people, procedural safeguards are an equal-
izer, and desirably so. This supposition is inherently problematic for two
reasons. One, the procedural guarantees to ensure reasonableness, impar-
tiality, equality etc., presume clarity of the standards, and how they must
be met; two, even if the standards are admitted as variable, the procedural
fairness—through transparency and a democratic functioning—in its
imperviousness to the particularity and variability of the people it applies
to, tends to defeats its very purpose. The age of human rights and individu-
alization of the rights language has preferred to ignore the differences, in
the attempt to achieve equality. The resolution of this dilemma by means
of a distinction between form and content, substance and procedure saw
the regulation of the interaction of individuals through the domain of for-
mal and procedural rules, devoid of any content or particularity; blind to
particularities such as religion and race.41
The Treaty of the European Union, upon which the authors base their
procedural mechanisms, opts for an individualistic approach, enshrining
fundamental civil and political rights as individual rights. “All citizens
shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agen-
cies.”— notwithstanding the paternalistic tone, this provision is said to
enshrine the principles of civil equality as the guiding democratic princi-
41 Seth, S. (2012), “The Limits of International Relations Theory: A Postcolonial Cri-
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ple. “Rights are a key element in the universalization projects of ideo-
logical intelligentsias of all stripes. A universalization project takes an inter-
pretation of the interests of some group, less than the whole polity, and
argues that it corresponds to the interests or to the ideals of the whole.
Rights arguments do this: they restate the interests of the group as charac-
teristics of all people.”42 The individualization of the rights paradigm has
systematically undone the concept of a collective, in its attempt to equalize
everyone, beyond their differences. Much like the concept of sovereign
equality as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the universal human
rights project does a disservice to the diverse needs of people, either as a
collective or as an individual.
Article 9 reinforces, according to the authors, the conceptions of democ-
racy for the international level without positing or requesting the forma-
tion of a new people or a new nation, but by relying on the idea of a cos-
mopolitan or transnational citizenship. Authors believe that this doctrine
of a transnational or cosmopolitan citizenship might be relevant to courts
based on individual rights, like the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter American Court of Human Rights, and even the International Court
of Justice. The basis for this citizenship was individual rights that flowed
from supranational sources that can be enforced against domestic and
supranational acts that impinged upon them. In Western liberal democra-
cies, public authority requires legitimation through one principal source:
the citizens of the polity. The deepest, most clearly engraved hallmark of
citizenship in these democracies is that power vests in citizens, to enable
institutions that will exercise governance on behalf of, and for, the citizens.
However, citizens/individuals are subjects only in the effect of the law, and
the ability to go to court and enjoy a right does not emancipate them. “Cit-
izenship should reflect not merely the politics of public authority, but also
the social reality of peoplehood and the identity of the polity”43; the theo-
retical framework within which the international public authority speaks
in the name of its democratic subject does not reflect that reality.
One of the touchstones of the positive law upon which von Bogdandy
and Venzke base their thesis, is that of the courts creating or reflecting pop-
ular will, more specifically the “international representativeness” of the
42 Kennedy, D. (2002), “The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies” In: W.
Brown and J. Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique. Durham: Duke University
Press, 178–227.
43 Weiler, J.H. (1998), “To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization”, Working
Paper Series in European Studies (spring), 1–52, available at https://core.ac.uk/downl
oad/pdf/148847645.pdf, accessed 7 February 2020.
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bench—a concept whereby the authors claim the judges can fulfil the
democratic mandate entrusted to them, if they render their decisions inde-
pendently, impartially and expertly. Relying on these high-values in the
international sphere, whilst not enunciating an ethnocentrism, is much
like Thomas Franck’s resort to a procedural gateway to universal values.44
Franck describes fairness as a “human, subjective, contingent quality which
merely captures in one word a process of discourse, reasoning, and negotiation
leading, if successful, to an agreed formula located at a conceptual intersec-
tion between various plausible formulas for allocation”45.
The concept of legitimation serves particular interest in this context.
Considered as the process by which authority is seen as “valid and appropri-
ate”, the dark side of legitimation is often obscured by the affirmation it
provides.46 Max Weber observed that power and legitimation, often
derived from the consent of those subjected to it, depends either on the
tradition, on the personal traits of the leader, or the legality of the rules
laid down.47 That this leads to the most “legitimate” means to dominate
often goes unheeded. International courts, like any other institution, wield
power that determines how precedents are created and how the normative
world is shaped. Their deriving legitimacy through a means that may be
democratic does not necessarily avoid the relations of domination they are
able to maintain, by virtue of the functional importance they possess. The
halo over democratic functioning, as asserted by liberal theorists, is often
misguided to the point of heralding representativeness, impartiality and
independence of the judiciary as the hallmarks of its success. The theory of
democratic adjudication of international courts, by putting forth such a
viewpoint, normalizes such expectation and equalizes the (diverse) people
it claims to represent. The lack of popular will is imaginably apparent,
although the existing procedure, process and the rule of law that are
present are all components of the Liberal theory of democracy.48
44 See: Tasioulas, J. (2002), “International law and the Limits of Fairness”, European
Journal of International Law 13(4), 993–1023. In this article, the author compares
Franck’s approach to that of the Italian philosopher, Danilo Zolo, in how they
tackle ethnocentrism and universal values. While Zolo injects into any type of a
universal an inherent ethnocentrism, Franck deflects the criticism by resorting to
a procedural mechanism.
45 Franck, supra note 39, 14.
46 Marks, supra note 22, 20.
47 Weber, M. (1965), Politics as a Vocation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
48 Kennedy, D. (1997), Critique of Adjudication. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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The idea that the judges, through their “democratic” selection, impar-
tiality and independence, can bring about the representativeness within
the workings of their court, devoid of any partiality, is perhaps an idealistic
supposition. Whilst perceptions of partiality are subjective, the conception
of impartiality mandates an objectively plausible view of the law and its
application.49 I think of judges as part of the political system/State they
come from, not just as “appliers” of law made by someone else, but also as
formers of the sentiments that express themselves in their decisions, and in
treaties or other legal instruments. Without underestimating the judicial
contribution to gradual formation of consensus in favour/against some-
thing, it still might be simplistic to denounce this process as “undemo-
cratic”. There is no “private” sphere in which the will of the people could
form without contamination by all the various sources of authority in soci-
ety. It is equally simplistic to sanitize this authority through the theory that
judges reflect changing social ideas and customs. They do indeed reflect
them, but in their diversity and above all in their contradictions.50 This is
not to say that the court does not shape or reshape the demos, but that the
judges these days think of themselves as social entrepreneurs or constitu-
tional activists is perhaps indicative of the shift from their previous role of
laying foundations of judicial review, a model of rule of law and of adjudi-
cation, and guiding of colonial lawyering into a constitutional profession.
In their previous role, they were mindful of the wider question of social
legitimation of the founding instrument, be it of their court or the demos.
Equally, it is important to take note of the dilemma of the judges who,
through their election/selection domestically, oscillate between the paradox
of increasing the representativeness of the bench because of the state they
come from and the decreasing standard of impartiality if they were found
not to distance themselves from that state. The basis for this conundrum
stems from the hypothesis that the bench can be reconstructed through a
democracy-oriented approach.
The fairness of judicial proceedings or the bench evades the incoherence
and instability of the meaning of fairness, again. Whom do the judges owe
fairness to in the case of an international criminal trial, for example, as the
one I outlined above? One of the basic tenets of international criminal law
is the right to a fair trial. As Rigney writes, “there appears to be a dedica-
49 Megret, F. (2015), “In Search of International Impartiality”, ESIL Reflections 4(8),
1–6, available at https://esil-sedi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ESIL-Reflection-F
rederic-Megret_0.pdf, accessed 7 February 2020.
50 Kennedy, supra note 48, 40.
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tion to fairness amongst international legal practitioners”, that it is consid-
ered a legitimating force.51 Yet, positing how much of the trial must aspire
for fairness, Judge Van Den Wyngaert states in the Katanga case: “in order
for a court of law to have the legal and moral authority to pass legal and
moral judgment on someone, especially when it relates to such serious
allegations as international crimes, it is essential (…) to scrupulously
observe the fairness of the proceedings and to apply the standard of proof
consistently and rigorously. It is not good enough that most of the trial has
been fair. All of it must be fair.”52 Here the reference to the court of law
implies the role of the judges as the bearers of the authority reposed in the
institution they speak in the name of, and from these fallible beings is
expected a clear and shared understanding of fairness, as stipulated in the
statutory responsibilities.
The acquittal by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Gombo
Bemba53 and later the ICC’s Pre Trial Chamber’s decision regarding autho-
rizing investigation of the situation in Afghanistan as being against the
“interests of justice”54 were questioned and challenged by those who
believed the judges were not speaking in the name of the victims. Both
cases demonstrated to scholars a failure of the judiciary to aid the prosecu-
tor’s case.55 What fairness was expected of these judges? Or were they recog-
nized as mere cogs in a system that was ready to put another name on its
list of sentenced criminals? What becomes unclear in this case is which of
the two choices would increase the legitimacy of the court: one that puts
more people away in prisons, or one that defers to the rule of law and pro-
cesses even at the cost of acquittal? It becomes clear that the international
community does not know the answer to that question. Therefore, to sup-
pose that factors such as fairness of procedural guarantees is the way for-
ward is to oversimplify the debate.
51 Rigney, S. (2015), “‘That a Trial is Fair’: The Centrality and Incoherence of Fair-
ness in International Criminal Trials” In: A. Savarian et al. (eds), Procedural Fair-
ness in International Courts and Tribunals. London: British Institute of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, 119–134.
52 Prosecutor v. Katanga Judgment (Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van Den Wyn-
gaert), International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No ICC-01/04–01/07,
7 March 2014, Judge Van Den Wyngaert, 311.
53 Case No ICC-01/05–01/08–3636-Red (Official Case No) ICL 1849 (ICC 2018).
54 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Pre-Trial
Chamber II, 12 April 2019.
55 See: Sadat, supra note 36; Amman, supra note 36; Heinze, supra note 35.
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Conclusion: The Road to Inequality is Paved with Democratic Intentions
Whether the international courts offer the possibility of giving a voice to
individuals who are affected by actions of a foreign state towards ameliorat-
ing problems of democratic inclusion, is a proposition that deserves fur-
ther probing. Notwithstanding the absence of these individuals in the cre-
ation of the courts, can their representation be ensured by a procedural
fairness that guarantees its legitimacy? As Aida Torres Pérez mentions in
the previous chapter, should international courts (pretend to) speak in the
name of anyone at all, other than the parties to the dispute?56 However,
that falls short too, when we take into account the asymmetry of the par-
ties. The individuals that the authors believe the international courts can
shape the freedoms of often suffer from the very lack of freedom to access
the court, or to participate in the transnational or global publics with
which the authors claim they can engage critically.57 Not to suggest that
international courts are entirely incompetent to provide for such rights
and freedoms, but that they remain a distant recourse for many whose
basic guarantees fail for reasons owing to the hierarchical structures,
whether locally or globally. The discourse must first attend to the struc-
tural deficiencies of the system of international courts that exclude the
groups who could best benefit from its power. The belief that the courts
speak in the name of the people, even if indirectly, is more of an assuaging
argument about an institutional mechanism that is here to stay, with all its
shortcomings, and less a critical reflection that challenges our normative
assumptions.
While I challenge the main hypotheses of courts and their democratic
legitimacy, I admit that there are important victories won by various
courts, especially the ECHR, that are able to limit the authoritarianism of
States. Yet, it is necessary that we contest its contributions at every opportu-
nity it appears deficient. For centuries, hegemons have created institutional
frameworks that have appeared to work for the cause of the vulnerable, or
the voiceless, against the authoritarianism of the existing systems, whilst in
reality advancing their own causes and agendas. Several critical scholars
like Anghie have exposed the underlying biases and interests that have con-
tinued to be at play in the guise of a humanitarianism. To ignore those
biases in order to restore faith in the international system would at best be
III.
56 Cf. the chapter written by Aida Torres Perez: “In Nobody's Name: A Checks and
Balances Approach to International Judicial Independence”.
57 Von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 3, 212.
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a disservice to those who continue to rely on them for their piece of the
pie. The competing interests along with the competing agendas of various
courts and jurisdictions do not simplify the answer to the question “in
whose name do the courts speak?”. If anything, it exposes the complexity of
the system of international adjudication, which remains a political project
with very long genealogical roots.
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